“The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless.”

and other Steven Weinberg quotes

http://thinkexist.com/quotation/the_more_the_universe_seems_comprehensible-the/327172.html

China's Market-Oriented Reforms in Retreat

http://english.caixin.cn/2011-07-05/100275974.html

Economist: China's Market-Oriented Reforms in Retreat

Wu Jinglian, researcher at the Development and Research Center at the State Council, said reforms to the state economy have undergone a reversal of momentum since the start of the 2000s

(Beijing) - China's "market forces have regressed" as government agencies have started to play a more obstructive role in resource allocation, Wu Jinglian, one of China's foremost economists, said on July 4.

(Wu Jinglian/Li Mo)

Although the state economy no longer contributes a major portion to gross domestic product, it maintains a monopoly in sectors like petroleum, telecoms, railways and finance, Wu said in a keynote speech in the opening ceremony of a global conference sponsored by the International Economic Association.

Governments at various levels also have a huge hold over major economic resources such as land and capital, said Wu, who serves as a researcher of the Development and Research Center at the State Council.

China still lacks a legal foundation that is indispensable for a modern market economy. Government officials intervene in the market at their will through administrative means, said Wu.

China's market forces gained vigor when the pricing of goods was liberalized in the early 1990s and millions of township enterprises were privatized at the turn of the last century, said Wu.

Entering the 2000s, however, the reform of state-owned enterprises suffered a setback, and SOEs have inhabited an increasingly assertive role in the market at the expense of private businesses. "The government has acted more intrusively in the name of macro-economic regulation," said Wu.

In China, there have been two distinct views over the origins of China's rapid economic growth.

One view attributes the achievement to the "China model" marked by the domination of the state economy and the forceful regulation over the economy by the government.

The other view holds that the high-speed growth was the result of market-based reforms and the liberation of the entrepreneurial spirit of the people.

For this question, Wu noted the current growth model is unsustainable and has been built on investment that exploits resources and damages the environment.

Another consequence of strengthened government control over the distribution of resources and active intervention in economic activity is more corruption and a larger wealth gap, said Wu.

A shift towards social governance in China

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/09/a-shift-towards-social-governance-in-china/

September 9th, 2011

Author: Yu Keping, Peking University

In recent years, a new institution has been established within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): at the very beginning of each year, a senior workshop of leading officials at the ministerial or provincial level is held at the Central Party School.

At this workshop, the priorities of each year’s work are laid out. This year’s Central Party School workshop, held in February, focused on ‘social management innovation’ (社会管理创新). President Hu Jintao, general secretary of the CCP, delivered a keynote speech which indicates that ‘social management innovation’ has now been placed at the top of the CCP agenda.

What exactly is ‘social management’? It is difficult to find an English translation that accurately reflects the Chinese meaning of ‘social management’. It is one of many political terms that are difficult to define outside their Chinese context. Broadly speaking, social management means the government manages and regulates social affairs (社会事务), social organisations (社会组织) and social life (社会生活), with the guidance of law. The connotation of social management is so broad that it includes areas such as social justice, public security, social stability, social trust, the coordination of various social interests, food safety, emergency management, city management and community governance. In other words, social management encompasses all government dealings with society, excluding business management and administrative management. Social management in China, therefore, could be understood as social governance that distinguishes itself both from economic governance and state governance.

The term ‘social management’ first appeared in the Proposal to Restructure the State Council, adopted by the central government in 1998. According to this proposal, the basic functions of government include ‘macro-economic control, social management and public services’. After that, social management began to gain prominence in the agendas of both the party and government. ‘Social management’ was further elaborated on in the 16th and 17th party congresses. ‘Strengthening and innovating social management’ was a focus at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee in 2010. According to the resolution of this session, ‘the general principle of social management is party leadership, government responsibility, social coordination and public participation. Relevant laws, institutions and capacities should be perfected and strengthened in order to be compatible with the demands of social management. Laws, regulations and policies need to be perfected, management and service functions of grassroots governments strengthened, the CCP’s organisational work at grassroots level improved, the functions of mass organisations and social organisations be fully exploited, and community autonomy and service functions enhanced.’ By following these actions, the CCP aims to improve social management and sharpen government capacity for delivering public services.

Why did China direct its focus of governance reform specifically towards social issues? At the very beginning of reform and opening up in the late 1970s, the major difficulties China faced included a backward economy, extreme poverty, administrative inefficiency and an ineffective legal system. Put differently, the major tasks at that time were to reform economic governance and state governance. After more than 30 years of reform and opening up, China has achieved rapid economic growth, accompanied by great improvements in people’s living standards, enhancement of administrative efficiency and the establishment of a basic legal system. With the establishment of the market economy and acceleration of industrialisation and urbanisation, the monolithic party-state governance model has become unsustainable — the functions of government have experienced tremendous change, social or civil organisations have rapidly emerged, the traditional working unit system (单位体制) has collapsed, the household registration system is under pressure to change, and the domestic migrant population is surging. Because of these changes, a lot of new social issues have emerged. Social stability has become a prominent problem and a crisis in social governance is ever more likely. Strengthening and perfecting social governance has become a pressing priority for the Chinese government.

In recent years, there have been some courageous institutional reforms in the social sphere, including the establishment and improvement of civil rights mechanisms, the protection and coordination of public interests, social safety, public security, social stability, public service, emergency management and grassroots governance, as well as social autonomy. The government has tried hard to broaden the scope and improve the quality of public service, establish a social security network as well as promote social autonomy. The ultimate purpose of social governance reform lies in mitigating the threat of social conflicts and safeguarding social order and stability.

A noticeable development in the recent social governance reform is that the Chinese government is attaching more importance to civil society. The CCP’s general principle for social management is ‘party leadership, government responsibility, social coordination and public participation’. A larger role for social organisations in social governance is an indispensable element of ‘social coordination and public participation’. By 2010, there were over 450,000 registered civil organisations and 250,000 community organisations, respectively, in China. If we take unregistered civil organisations into account also, the overall number would jump to over three million. The government has taken a cautious attitude towards civil organisations. More recently, however, top leaders have advocated the participation of social organisations in social management innovation. Top Chinese leaders even made it clear that social organisations would receive more support and encouragement from the government. In the recently adopted 12th Five-Year Plan on Social and Economic Development of China, ‘pushing the development of social organisations forward’ was given an unprecedented level of attention. These changes indicate that although the government has never made reference to the term ‘civil society’ in official documents, it now recognises its importance.

With continuing urbanisation, modernisation and democratisation, the Chinese government is certain to face more pressure in maintaining social stability. Social governance reform is a way for the government to release social pressures and maintain social stability. Success will largely rests on the growth of democracy and rule of law, increased civil engagement and social autonomy, and development of civil society.

Yu Keping is Professor and Director of the China Center for Comparative Politics & Economics (CCCPE), and also Professor and Director, Center for Chinese Government Innovations, Peking University.

This article was published in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Governing China’.

Local versus central governance in China: Providing basic public services

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/17/local-versus-central-providing-basic-public-services/

"At present, government revenues to provide basic public services are distributed unevenly between the central and local governments. Since the tax distribution system was set in 1994, the central government has been responsible for 50 per cent of all public revenues. Despite this, it has provided less than 10 per cent of the funding for the three basic public service spheres of compulsory education, public health and social security. Ninety per cent of the fiscal investment in these areas is carried out by local governments.

Differences in revenue between regions ensure that the level of basic public services provided across those regions will not be equal. For the most part, the level and quality of public services in the developed eastern regions are much higher than in the less-developed western regions. This phenomenon is very clear in the three public services spheres under discussion.

The current system of transferring revenue inhibits the provision of basic public services on a more equal footing. Not only does it fail to promote equal distribution of basic services, but it has also widened regional differences in service provision.

If China wants to achieve the goal of delivering public education, public health and social security at equal level across the nation, then the central and provincial governments should assume equal fiscal responsibility for providing these services. To this end, financial and administrative powers should be redistributed between the central and local governments until they match each other, and the current system of public revenue transfer should be reformed.

To achieve this, the existing system of tax revenue return should be gradually abolished. All general revenue transfer items should be integrated, bringing their attributes and functions into play. In addition, special revenue transfer programs should be strictly limited, and a better system of sub-provincial revenue transfer developed. It would also be profitable to explore a new system of revenue transfer which combines the current vertical and horizontal transfer systems."

China’s prospects for diminishing regional disparities

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/31/chinas-prospects-for-diminishing-regional-disparities/

"Will rapid industrial development in the less-developed centre and west reduce these inequalities in the next two decades?

This question permits an optimistic response: ‘yes, it is possible’. Recent analysis indicates the glory days of the east’s industrial dominance could be coming to an end, with the region no longer performing above the average across the broad spectrum of industrial sectors. In addition, there is evidence of rising costs in the east, which will provide the impetus for industrial upgrading there. In this context, a serious and committed pro-west (or at least non-pro-east) regional policy with substantial funding well spent on infrastructure and education could play a positive role in triggering self-sustaining industrial development outside the eastern region. Rising incomes in the east could provide a crucial source of demand for non-eastern products, with the east possibly becoming for western China what the industrialised world has been for the eastern region during its own industrial take-off – a stable consumer market.

However, for this to translate into a reduction in regional income inequalities would require the western region to grow faster than the east by at least 2 percentage points.  It is unlikely that changing patterns of industrial development in response to market forces and the current set of regional policies will be sufficient for achieving this objective . Even when taking other non-industrial factors into account, such as the potential for out-migration and resource rents to raise the per capita incomes of those who remain in the western region, it is unlikely that the speed of growth in western China will drive Chinese regional incomes towards equality.

The pessimistic response is that; ‘no, industrial development in the less-developed centre and west cannot possibly reduce these inequalities in the next two decades’. Even if rising costs in labour-intensive manufacturing in the east produced industrial upgrading there, industry would relocate outwards to competitor nations such as India and Vietnam. Western China would then be characterised by substantial pockets of poverty and underdevelopment. The east would become increasingly integrated into the global economy, while the west would remain isolated from the rest of the world.

This outcome would pose a serious threat to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, especially if it fails to implement policies effectively that reverse the situation.

What, then, is the most likely outcome?

The balance of evidence suggests an outcome somewhere in between these two extremes. The next two decades are likely to witness limited improvements in the distribution of regional per capita incomes underpinned partially by limited re-distribution of industry towards some but not all of China’s non-coastal provinces.  Thus regional inequality between the west and the rest of China is likely to be diminished marginally at best."

'contained contention'

Not the next Arab Spring: The China method for managing popular unrest

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/20/not-the-next-arab-spring-the-china-method-for-managing-popular-unrest/#more-21797

"Chinese leaders effectively provide an outlet for the most mobilised, informed and engaged segments of the population to express their opinions through selective tolerance of popular protests and policy debates. At the same time, the state relies upon pervasive surveillance, coercion and censorship to restrain activists from mobilising to directly challenge its rule. The result is a kind of contained contention, in which popular protests continue to erupt and influence specific policy decisions but do not fundamentally undermine the party-state’s authority."

‘Mass incidents’ in China

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/13/mass-incidents-in-china/
The vast majority of mass incidents have a clear objective — to defend or restore citizen rights encroached upon by authority or the market. Termed ‘responsive’ collective action by the late social scientist Charles Tilly, civil unrest is a normal social response to the infringement of rights to which there is no effective remedy.

Chinese nationalism and where it might lead

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/21/nationalism-and-where-it-might-lead/

The first is benevolent Chinese nationalism.
Second is controlled nationalism. 
Third is expanded nationalism. 
Fourth is aggressive nationalism.
Fifth is explosive nationalism in economic crisis. ...

Benjamin!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Work_of_Art_in_the_Age_of_Mechanical_Reproduction

Benjamin and video art...

陳獨秀

世界文明的發源地有二：一是科學研究室，一是監獄

story based mechanism

오늘의 아이디어...
variable based 말고...
cognitive approach를 해서.....

pragmatic approach (practice theory)와 같은 점 다른 점...
mechanism, the book에서 설명하는 메커니즘과 같은 점 다른 점...
(mechanism이라는 것 자체가 사실상 말되는 '스토리' 아닌가)
story는 episodic memory (--> age등 여러 요인들과 연관이 있음)에 의존.

Chris 그룹미팅에선 이걸로,,

지식과 아이덴터티

아주 오랜 옛날에는 한 사람이 거의 전분야에 걸쳐 박식한 지식을 쌓는다는 것이 가능하다고 생각했으나 언젠부턴가 그런 것은 완전 허상에 불과하다는 것을 알게 되었다. 사실 작은 분야라 하더라도 그 안에서의 지식을 마스터하기란 상당히 힘들다.

이런 생각이 연장되다가 결국 지식에 대한 허무주의까지로도 연결되었는데,

요즘에 든 다른 생각은, 결국 중요한 것은 얼마나 많은 지식이 한 사람 안에 축적되냐가 아니라, 개인이 가진 지식과 정보들이 서로 체계적인 연결고리를 이루며 어떤 스토리를 만들어내냐가 중요한 것이라는 생각이 들었다. 결국 지식은 스토리를 만들어내기 위해 쌓여지는 것. 많은 지식이 유리한 것은 풍부한, 유기적인, 스토리를 만들어내기 좋기 때문인 것이지 그것 자체가 대단한 의미를 지닌 것은 아니다.

그런 의미에서 지식을 얼마나 많이 가지고 있느냐만큼 중요한 것은, 그런 지식, 생각, 정보들이 얼마나 재미있고 의미있고 가치있는 형태로 얼개를 이루어 스토리를 형성하느냐이다.

---

on another note, 요즘 사회학에서 많이 연구하는 것이 identity의 문제인데,
(지식을 기반으로 한) 스토리도 결국 아이덴터티의 문제로 연결되긴 하지만,
감정상태의 조합을 바탕으로한 아이덴터티도 현실에서 개인의 아이덴터티를
구성하는 중요한 핵인것 같다. 연령, 성별, 소득, 직업 등등만이 아니라...
그런 아이덴터티의 이미지는 본인 스스로도 소비하고 타인에 의해서도 소비된다.


현대는 이런, (지식-스토리) + (감정의 스타일-아이덴터티)의 조합이 중요하다.

역설

정치 부패 인덱스에서 세계 39위인 나라.
정치가 깨끗해져야 한다고 하면서도 깨끗한 사람이 정치하겠다고 하면 '정치는 아무나 하나' '정치판 가서 물들면...'이라고 하는 사고 방식.

비상식적 상황을 상식으로 바꿔야 한다고 하면서도 비상식적 상황의 모순들에 너무 쉽게 자기 마음을 내놓는 사고 방식.

둘을 아는 사람들이 하나 아는 사람들 위에 군림하고 넷 정도 아는 사람들을 잡아끌어내리고 물어뜯어서 둘이나 하나 수준으로 끌어내려야 만족하는 사고방식.

등등

이런 한국적 실상이 싫지만 전에 쓴 글대로....

Religious views of founding fathers

"Lighthouses are more useful than churches."
- Benjamin Franklin

"This would be the best of all possible worlds if there were
no religion in it!"
- John Adams

"Christianity is the most perverted system that ever shone on man.":
- Thomas Jefferson

알고보면 매우 다른 미국 건국아버지들의 신앙에 미국의 종교적 아이덴터디를 등치시키는 것은 사실 역사적으로는 오류...

한국이 싫다면...

별로 사회학적인 이야기라고 할 수는 없겠지만...

한국의 어떤 모습들이 싫다면,

그것은 한국의 구조나 문화에 문제가 있다기 보다는 사람들의 마음에 문제가 있다고 보는 편이 더 낫다고 생각한다.

그리고 나 자신은 그러한 마음을 가지지 않고, 다른 마음을 가지고 추구하며 살아가면 되는 것이라고 생각한다.

마음은 전파되고, 공감을 얻으며, 비슷한 마음들을 만나게 된다.

내가 비판하고자 하는 대상이 가진 마음과 정반대의 마음을 가지는 것이, 그 대상을 말로 비판하는 것보다 훨씬 더 큰 공명을 울린다. 현재의 마음을 초월하지 않으면, 무언가를 바꾸는 것은 요원해질 뿐이다.

단상...

1. 지식인이란...
자신의 일을 겸손한 자세로 성실하게, 참을성 있게 하면서 거기에
다른 사람을 위하는 자세가 갖추어져 있는 사람이 지식인이다.
더 짧은 버젼으로 말하면, 자신의 일을 윤리적으로 열심히 하는 사람.
그것을 통해 바닥이 닦여진 사람이 사회적으로도 무언가 할 말이 있고
말할 자격이 있다. 지식인으로서의 자격은 학위나 교양이나 직업이
주는 것이 아니다.

(지식인 on wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual)


2. 다른 사람에 대한 말...
현재 우리 사회는 아무리 훌륭한 사람이 등장해봐야 떼로 달려들어
끊임없이 물어뜯고 할퀴고 잡아 끌어내리는 상황으로 되어있다.
그걸 떠나서 남에 대한 평가는 쉴새 없이 이루어지고, 남 욕하고 남 험담하고
안좋게 보고 하는 것이 일상적으로 이루어진다.
어떤 학자들은 거기에 진화론적인 배경이 있다고도 하지만, 어쨌든
한 사람에 대한 평가는 무조건 "나는 잘 모르지만"이  (http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/495514.html) 기본이어야 하고,
그 사람 앞에서도 떳떳이 이야기할 수 있는 것을 그 사람이 없는 자리에서
이야기해야 한다. 떳떳이까지는 아니더라도, 부끄러움 없이 이야기할 수 있는 것을.

"'추측'은 참 부정확하더라고요."

부끄러움이 없는 추측이 아니라면, 말하지 말아야 한다. 그런 추측과 험담은
독이 되어 공기중에 날아다니면서 사람과 사회를 병들게 한다.

이념

이념적 성향, 포지션.... 이런 것의 유용한 측면, 전략적 필요성 또한 있지만, 어떠한 종류든간에 '믿음'이라는 것에 긍정적이지 않은 나는 그것들에 대해 근본적으로 불편하다.

결국 이념이라는 것은 social cognition의 연장선상에서 나오는 것이고, 그것의 생성/유지가 group loyalty와 cognitive efficiency라는 두 가지 메커니즘에 의해 상당부분 이루어지는 것이기 때문에.

'현실'을 파악하고 바꾸는 것에 저 두가지는 득보다 실이 많다.

이념이나 이데올로기보다는 '의심'과, 의심을 최대한으로 잠재울 수 있는 자명한 (self-evident) 사회적 공리들(social axioms)의 체계에 기대는 것이 더 맞다고 보여진다.

이반 카라마조프

...

신은 인간 세상의 정의와 고통의 문제에 ('거의') 개입하지 않는다.

자연법칙 또한 오히려 우리가 생각하는 정의와 반대방향으로 가는 성격을 가졌다.

인간이 적극적으로 개입하지 않으면 정의는 도태된다.

안철수

안철수의 시장 출마와 관련하여 여러 이야기들이 많다.
정작 본인은 아직 고민 중인 것 같은데... 검증되지 않은 루머들도 팩트인 것 처럼
전파가 되고.. (특히 윤여준과의 관계와 관련해서)

개인적으로 대단히 장점이 많은 사람이라고 보여지고, 행정 경험이 없다거나 정치판에서의 세나 경험이 없다는 것으로 비판하는 것은 여러가지 측면에서 반박될 수 있다고 생각한다. (예를 들어 그런 논리라면 안철수는 애시당초 경영자의 길로 가지도 말았어야 한다. 책보고 공부밖에 안한 얼굴 하얀 백면서생의 의사가 어떻게 그 험한 중소기업 사장의 길로 가느냐고 뜯어말렸어야 한다.)

때로는 한국에 진보와 보수의 논의와 논쟁들이 사실 문제의 표면만을 긁고 있다고 느껴질 때가 많다. 그 밑은 비상식과, 부패와, 세력을 형성하고 있는 사집단들이 몸통을 이루고 있는데... 그래서 속칭 '진보'가 집권한다고 해서 어떤 특정 문제가 크게 해결될 것 같지도 않다. (물론 더 큰 문제가 생기는 것을 막을 수 있을지언정...) 어차피 그 다음에 정권을 뺏길 가능성은 매우 크고 그러한 사이클이 영구히 지속될 수 밖에 없다. 결국 상식과 비상식의 대결이 게임의 핵심인게 맞다. '합리적 보수'는 '합리적 진보'에서도 열렬히 환영할만 하다. 하지만 비상식의 게임에선 보수나 진보나 합리성의 틀 안에서 담론을 키우고 얘기하기가 힘들다. 증오와 배타성을 바탕으로한 싸움만 지속될 뿐... (누가 더 맞고 틀리냐를 떠나...) 물론 승자는 영원히 결정되지 않을 것이고. 실질적인 양당제의 한계라고 해야할까.

아무튼 진보진영을 위해서라도 이데올로기 지형이 바뀌어야 한다. 새로운 인물이 필요하고 또 필요하다. 안철수가 얼마나 적합한 인물인가는 결국 시간이 보여줄 문제.

다만 시점이 지금이 맞느냐....는 생각해 볼 문제인 듯 하다.